We present a market for allocating and scheduling resources to agents who have specified budgets and need to complete specific tasks. Two important aspects required in this market are: (1) agents need specific amounts of each resource to complete their tasks, and (2) agents would like to complete their tasks as soon as possible. In incorporating these aspects, we arrive at a model that deviates substantially from market models studied so far in economics and theoretical computer science. Indeed, all known techniques developed to compute equilibria in markets in the last decade and half seem not to apply here.
Introduction
The Internet has transformed not only the economy but also the central object of study of economists, the market, by creating innovative and immensely important marketplaces. Indeed, quoting Papadimitriou [35] :
The Internet ... transformed, informed and accelerated markets, while creating new, theretofore unimaginable kinds of market-in addition to being itself, in important ways, a market.
The most important such market so far was the multi-billion dollar adwords market, and researchers from algorithms and AGT have contributed handsomely to its efficient operation [33, 16, 18, 39, 17, 1] . A quickly emerging market is the cloud computing market. Since most projections predict that this market will dwarf even the adwords market, it is quintessential to understand its idiosyncrasies and design algorithms and mechanisms for its efficient operation.
The Elastic Cloud Computing (EC2) market of Amazon is the biggest provider of cloud computing resources today. The EC2 market rents out a number of different types of resources -virtual machines (VM) with different kinds of capabilities, e.g., compute optimized, storage optimized, memory optimized and general purpose. While this market is still in its infancy, as is the science behind it, future growth in the size and complexity of this market calls for mechanisms that are steeped in sound economic theory and the theory of algorithms.
The power of the pricing mechanism is well explored and understood in economics: It allocates resources efficiently since prices send strong signals about what is wanted and what is not, and it prevents artificial scarcity of goods while at the same time ensuring that goods that are truly scarce are conserved. Hence it is beneficial to both consumers and producers. For this reason, we propose an equilibrium-based mechanism for a spot market for cloud computing resources. 1 In addition, we give a polynomial time algorithm to find an equilibrium.
Two important aspects required in this model are: (1) agents desire duration guarantees: they must be allocated each resource for a specified amount of time, and (2) agents would like to complete their tasks as soon as possible. In incorporating these aspects, we arrive at a model that deviates substantially from market models studied so far in economics and theoretical computer science. The latter models define preferences of agents via a utility function: an agent prefers that bundle of goods which maximizes a given (usually concave) utility function, subject to a budget constraint; strict constraints on goods are never allowed. In contrast, our model allows agents to state their exact requirement for each good, and satisfies these covering requirements fully. In addition, our model incorporates a temporal aspect, i.e., there is a notion of time in the model and prices of resources are a function of time. These features make our market model suitable for resource allocation and scheduling, which are central to cloud computing.
These differences from standard models manifest themselves in a fundamental way: the set of equilibrium prices could form a non-convex, yet connected region. This immediately rules out a convex programming based approach, and in fact indicates that the problem is computationally hard. Hence it was quite surprising that the problem did admit a polynomial time algorithm.
Our Model and Results
Let A be a set of n agents, indexed by i, and G be a set of m different types of goods, indexed by j. Time is divided into slots, each of one time unit. Assume that there are s slots and that they are indexed by t. Each agent i has a requirement of r ij (≥ 0) units of good j. For each slot t we are specified a set G t , the set of goods that are available in this slot. For each good j ∈ G, a positive weight w j is specified, representing the relative importance of this good. Let f ijt be the allocation of good j to agent i in slot t. An allocation is feasible if it assigns the required amount of each good to each agent, i.e., for each i ∈ A and j ∈ G, t f ijt = r ij , and it assigns at most one unit of good j in slot t if j ∈ G t and does not assign any of good j in slot t otherwise. Each agent i wants to minimize her own weighted flow time, which is defined to be j t w j tf ijt .
Suppose that we allocate the goods to agents using a market mechanism: agent i has a total budget of m i , and let p jt denote the price per unit amount of good j in slot t. Then, the amount of money charged to agent i for this allocation is j,t f ijt · p jt . We will say that agent i gets an optimal allocation if relative to prices p, agent i minimizes her weighted flow time, subject to the budget constraint that the allocation does not cost more than her budget. Finally, we will say that a feasible allocation and prices (f, p) are an equilibrium if the following two conditions hold:
1. Each agent gets an optimal allocation relative to prices p.
2. If in some slot t a good j ∈ G t is not fully allocated, i.e., to the extent of one time unit, then p jt = 0.
We also define a model where time is continuous, and prices can change at any time. The flow time of an agent is also calculated continuously, as an integral.
We provide a polynomial time algorithm to compute an equilibrium in this market. As with the classical Arrow-Debreu and Fisher market models, we show that our market model satisfies the First Welfare Theorem, stating that equilibrium allocations are Pareto optimal. Additionally, we show that our market based mechanism is incentive compatible, i.e., it is in the best interest of the agents to truthfully report m i and r ij s.
Our proposal for the cloud computing spot market application is to run our market periodically, each time allocating resources to all agents who are currently seeking them. It may happen that some of the resources in the early slots of the current period are already allocated in the previous run of the market. Observe that our model is general enough -it allows G t to be a proper subset of G -hence it will only allocate the remaining goods in these slots.
Non convex solution sets: A natural question, given the strong connection between equilibria in Fisher markets and convex programs, is whether there exists a convex program that captures the equilibrium allocation/prices in this market. We show via examples that this is unlikely to be the case. In fact, the set of equilibrium prices could have "holes" in between, i.e., this set could have genus > 0. We show an example of a set with a high genus in Figure 1 on page 3. Given this, it is surprising that we are able to find a combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for this problem. As far as we are aware, there is no other natural example where such a phenomenon happens.
Techniques
The non-convexity of the set of equilibrium prices is a good indication of the difficulty involved here. For instance, this immediately rules out any convex programming based solution. All other known techniques developed to compute equilibria in markets in the last decade and half don't seem to apply here. The distinguishing feature of our market is the fact that the buyer's optimization problem contains a covering as well as a packing constraint. Due to this, the preferences of the buyers look very different from any quasi-concave utility based preference. (See Figure 2 on All prices on the shaded region and on the boundary are equilibria. However, points on the non-shaded region are not equilibria, say u 2 and u 3 in the figure, then none of the points in their convex combination is an equilibrium.
For a special case of our problem, with one good and when the requirements are all 1, we show that equilibrium conditions are equivalent to a set of conditions that are reminiscent of the ironing procedure used in the characterization of optimal auctions by Myerson [34] . It is in fact "one higher derivative" analog of Myerson's ironing, which given a possibly non-monotone function, asks for an ironed function that is monotone non-increasing, and is such that the area under the curve (starting at 0) of the ironed function is always higher than that for the given function. Further, the ironed function given by this procedure is the minimal among all such functions. This means that wherever the area under the curve differs for the two functions, the ironed function is constant. (See Figure 3 on page 5.)
In the special case of our model with one good and unit requirements, the equilibrium price of the good as a function of time is obtained as an ironed analog of the money function: the function i → m i , where we assume the m i s are sorted in the decreasing order. This money function is monotone non-increasing by definition but it need not be a convex function. The price as a function of time must be a monotone non-increasing and convex function. The area under the curve of the price function must always be higher than that of the money function; further, wherever the two areas are different, the price function must be linear. One can see that the conditions are the same as that of Myerson's ironing, except each condition is replaced by a higher derivative analog. Unlike Myerson's, the solution to our problem is no longer unique! The story for multiple goods is a lot more complicated. Here there are multiple price functions, one for each good, but only a single money function. We observe that the right thing to do here is to search in the space of price slopes, or equivalently exchange rates between cost and delay for each buyer. It turns out that the optimal way for a buyer to spread his money among different goods is to combine delay and price linearly using a coefficient λ i for delay (and 1 for price), and buy the cheapest r ij slots of good j according to this. Buyers who have a higher λ i get scheduled earlier. In each iteration of the algorithm, we identify On the left is a typical example of indifference curves with a quasi concave utility function over two variables. On the right are indifference curves/regions for the case of 1 good and 2 slots. Everything below the 45 degree line is one region, and is the least preferred, since the buyer does not get his required amount of resources here. Along the 45 degree line, there is a total order, with the point on the x axis being the most preferred and the point on the y axis being the least preferred. The indifference curves are now axis parallel lines, since getting more than his requirement doesn't matter for the buyer. The entire region to the right of the point (r 1 , 0) is the most preferred region. the set of buyers who are going to have the smallest λ i s, and get the latest of the slots. This requires doing a binary search where to determine which direction the binary search moves, a submodular minimization problem must be solved. We show that we can set the prices of these slots so that it doesn't conflict with our future choices, and recurse with the remaining buyers.
Other Applications and Related Work
There is a long history of market based mechanisms: the New York Stock Exchange uses such a mechanism to determine the opening prices, and copper and gold prices in London are fixed using a similar procedure [37] . Hurwicz [24] showed that strategic behavior by agents participating in such a mechanism can lead to inefficiencies. Babaioff et al. [3] show price of anarchy bounds on such mechanisms.
Fair allocation Market equilibrium outcomes have been used to allocate resources by a central planner seeking a fair allocation, even when there is no actual market/monetary transfers. Equilibrium conditions are often considered inherently fair, due to the properties mentioned earlier. The following are some examples.
• The proportional fair allocation is widely used in the design of computer networks. It is a well known fact that this is equivalent to the equilibrium allocation in a Fisher market [31] .
• Budish [5] proposes "competitive outcome from equal incomes" (CEEI) as a way to allocate courses to students: the allocation is an equilibrium in a market for courses in which the students participate The solid curve with the blue dots is the given curve, which is non-monotone. The dashed curve with the orange dots is the ironed curve, which is monotone. On the right is an example of our problem. The solid curve is the money function, which is monotone but not convex. The dashed one is the price function, which is convex. Both dashed curves are such that their "area under the curve" is higher than that for the solid curves, and satisfy a minimality condition among all such curves.
with equal budgets (with random perturbations to break ties). This scheme has been successfully used at the Wharton business school [6] .
• Cole et al. [11] show that a suitable modification of the Fisher market equilibrium allocation can be used as a solution to a problem of fair resource allocation, without money. The mechanism is truthful, and satisfies an approximate per-agent welfare guarantee. The motivation for [11] is also allocation of cloud computing resources, among agents internal to a company running its own cloud services, but it does not capture the temporal aspect.
Fair allocation of resources in a scheduling setting has received a lot of attention lately [23, 29, 36, 41] . However, most of these focus on instantaneous fairness, which ignores the important temporal aspect of jobs. Our market model suggests a natural fair allocation mechanism: assign m i s based on agents' relative importance 2 , and use the resulting equilibrium allocation.
Equilibrium outcomes have also been used in the design of online algorithms in a scheduling context by Im et al. [25, 26] . They give the first constant competitive online algorithms in a multi-resource scheduling framework for the objectives of completion time and flow time. It is possible that equilibria in our model will find similar applications, given that it already incorporates the scheduling aspect.
There has been a lot of activity in the theoretical computer science literature on algorithms for and hardness of computing market equilibria [12, 15, 13, 19, 14, 22, 27, 28, 20, 40, 10, 8, 7] . As mentioned before, our market model seems to be quite different from these markets in terms of computability.
Preliminaries
Consider the market M described in Section 1.1, with set A of agents and set G of resources/goods. Resources are available in unit amount over a period of time. Time is divided into slots, each with unit time, and G t is the set of resources available in slot t. Each agent i ∈ A has budget m i and needs resource j for total of r ij amount. Thus total requirement for good j is R j = i r ij . We assume that there are enough slots to fulfill everyone's requirement.
Relative importance of good j is specified by w j , in the sense that if f ijt denotes the amount of good j agent i gets in slot t, then she wishes to minimize her weighted flow time jt w j tf ijt . Therefore, at prices p jt for good j in slot t, agent i's optimal demand bundle may be computed by the following linear program (LP).
min :
Prices p are said to be at equilibrium, if when each agent is given its optimal bundle, market clears. In other words total demand of every good in each slot is at most one, and under-demanded slots are priced zero. Formally,
Our goal is to find such a prices p and corresponding allocation f . As noted in Section 1.1 equilibrium prices may not be convex and therefore convex programming approach is ruled out. Even to show rationality of equilibrium prices, it is not clear if any of the previous approaches, based on equilibrium configuration [40] or LCP [20] , are applicable. This is because, both budget and covering constraints being present in the optimal bundle LP. Therefore it becomes necessary to understand characterization of equilibria for this model, done in the next section.
From now on we assume that if r ij = 0 then it is at least one. 3 For notational simplicity we will also assume that G t = G, ∀t for now, and later in Section 5 we will show how to extend all the results without this assumption.
Equilibrium Characterization
A given market may have many equilibrium prices. In this section we derive sufficient conditions for p and f to be an equilibrium. We note that these conditions are not necessary and therefore may end up characterizing a particular type of equilibrium. We start with writing KKT condition for (1) LP. Let β ij , λ i , and γ ijt be the dual variables of first, second and f ijt ≤ 1 constraints of this LP. Apart from non-negativity of these variables, the KKT conditions give us:
Next lemma characterizes allocation of an agent with λ i = 0.
Lemma 1 If for an agent λ i = 0, then for all j ∈ G we have f ijt = 1, ∀t < r ij and f ij r ij = r ij − r ij .
Proof : It suffices to show ∀t, ∀j ∈ G such that f ijt > 0 we have that ∀t < t, f ijt = 1. Using the KKT conditions (3), we get that
Lemma 1 and the last condition of (3) implies that only the first agent allocated to a good can underspend. Using this fact, in the algorithm we will make sure that all the agent spends all their money, and therefore without loss of generality (wlog) we can assume that λ i > 0. Then dividing the first condition of (3) by λ i and renaming
by λ i , and γ ijt λ i by γ ijt gives:
Using (4), next we characterize optimal bundle of any given agent.
Lemma 2 Given prices p jt and λ i , for every good, agent i demands slots in increasing order of (w j t)
Proof : Using (4) and f ijt > 0 we get that (w j t )λ i + p jt = β ij − γ ijt . Therefore,
Lemma 2 shows a relation between two types of costs that an agent has to bear, namely delay and price paid. And λ i seem to act like a conversion rate between the two, i.e., one unit of delay is equivalent to λ i dollars. Using this next we show a strong connection between λ i s and prices.
Assuming γ ijt = 0: We next force all the γ ijt s to be 0; this is not necessary by any means but we will see that in the end we will still be able to find solutions satisfying this condition. This forces all the slots which an agent buys to have the same combined cost, namely (w j t)λ i + p jt . With this assumption, the complementary slackness conditions (4) are:
Next two lemmas give us a clean characterization of equilibrium prices. We will have to consider demand of a good from a set of agent, defined next.
Definition 3 For a set S ⊆ A of agents, define r j (S) = i∈S r ij be their total demand for good j.
This gives us a contradiction considering Lemma 2.
Lemma 5 For good j, if the first and last slot bought by agent i are s and s , such that s < s , then
Proof : We have that
With the same idea one we can show that ∀t > s ,
We also have that
Therefore using Lemma 4 we get that
Namely, prices for any good from earlier to later slot form a non-decreasing, piecewise linear convex curve. Piecewise-linearity comes from the fact that prices are discrete and if an agent is allocated to multiple slots then the difference in consecutive prices of corresponding slots is fixed to w j λ i for good j. Next we derive sufficient conditions for a feasible allocation to exist.
Definition 6
We say that an allocation f is weakly-feasible if ∀i, ∀j :
We say that an allocation f is feasible if it is weakly-feasible and ∀i, jt p jt f ijt = m i .
Assuming integer r ij s.
In what follows we assume that r ij s are non-negative integers to show the main intuition without notational complexity. We will remove this assumption later. Note that for any subset of agents S if total prices of earliest r j (S) slots is less than total money i∈S m i then someone will be left with money even when they are allocated the earliest slot. Based on this intuition we show the following lemma.
Lemma 8 There exists a feasible allocation f iff for all subsets S ⊆ A we have j,t≤r j (S) p jt ≥ i∈S m i and j,t≤r j (A) p jt = i∈A m i .
Proof : Forward direction follows from the fact that all the initial r j (A) slots for good j are filled. For the reverse direction, suppose no weakly-feasible solution is feasible. Consider a weakly-feasible allocation f that minimizes
At f there is a set of agents who are under-spending and another set who are over-spending. Denote these sets by S + and S − respectively, and let S 0 be the rest. Let π j (S), for S ∈ {S + , S − , S 0 }, be the set of slots with non-zero allocations to agents of S for good j.
For any good j if t ∈ π j (S − ), t ∈ π j (S + ) then t < t . Otherwise we can decrease F , by swapping allocation between agents of S − and S + allocated to t and t respectively. This will in fact decrease overall imbalance i |m i − jt p jt f ijt |. Similarly, if t ∈ π j (S 0 ) and t ∈ π j (S + ) then t < t . This is because we can again do the swapping, which will keep overall imbalance the same but decreases F since F is sum of squares of surpluses. Thus we have ∀t ∈ π j (S + ) and ∀t ∈ π j (A \ S + ), t ≤ t . Due to the fact that r j (S + ) is an integer and that f is weakly-feasible, the inequality should be strict. This implies slots π j (S + ) are 1 through r j (S + ), and are fully bought by agents of S + , implying j,
From Section 2 recall that market equilibrium has to satisfy optimal bundle and market clearing conditions. At prices p, allocation f form optimal bundle if f i is a solution of LP (1) for each agent i, and market clearing requires (15) to be satisfied. Using the fact that KKT conditions together with feasibility are sufficient for an optimal solution of an LP, next we derive sufficient conditions for λ i s and p jt s to constitute market equilibrium using the above analysis.
The basic idea is that prices constitute piecewise-linear convex, non-increasing curve, where slopes of the pieces are −w j λ i s. Furthermore, to ensure optimal bundles to the agents, they are allocated to segments with whose slope is −w j times their λ i .
Theorem 9
Given λ and prices p, such that λ 1 ≥ · · · ≥ λ |A| > 0, let agents be grouped in to Q 1 , . . . , Q u sets by equality of
then these are at equilibrium for market M.
Proof : We first show that there exists a feasible allocation f such that ∀d, ∀i ∈ Q d we have
and the last assumption of the theorem we get that there exist a feasible allocation f d for the agents in Q d to the slots t ∈ (r
Consider the allocation to be f = (f 1 , . . . , f u ). In order to complete the proof, we need to show there exists an evaluation for the vector β such that the KKT conditions hold.
Claim 10 We have that
Using the assumptions it is easy to show the following
Therefore, the lemma follows.
2
Hence the KKT conditions hold and the proof is completed.
Arbitrary rational r ij s. For the case where non-zero r ij s take arbitrary value ≥ 1, we will extend the characterization of Theorem 9. The primary difference from the case when r ij s are integer is that r j (S) may be fractional, and therefore we need to be careful while computing slots occupied by agents of S. For the characterization to go through we need to first prove the feasibility lemma with a slight change in the condition to allow fractionally allocated slots.
Lemma 11 Suppose first slot of each good j available only up to l j ≤ 1. There exists a feasible allocation f such that ∀i, jt p jt f ijt = m i iff for all subsets S ⊆ A we have
Proof : The proof idea is almost identical to proof of Lemma 8. Forward direction follows from the fact that all the initial r j (A) slots for good j are filled. For the reverse direction, suppose no weakly-feasible solution is feasible. Consider a weakly-feasible allocation f that minimizes
For any good j if t ∈ π j (S − ), t ∈ π j (S + ) then t < t . Otherwise we can decrease F , by swapping allocation between agents of S − and S + allocated to t and t respectively. This will in fact decrease overall
We will accordingly modify the conditions in Theorem 9.
Theorem 12 Given λ and prices p, such that λ 1 ≥ · · · ≥ λ |A| > 0, let agents be grouped in to Q 1 , . . . , Q u
. Using Lemma 8 and the last two assumptions of the theorem we get that there exist a feasible allocation f d for the agents in Q d to the slots t ∈ (r
of each good j. Consider the allocation to be f = (f 1 , . . . , f u ). In order to complete the proof, we need to show there exists an evaluation for the vector β such that the KKT conditions hold.
Claim 13 We have that
Therefore, the claim follows.
Then we have β ij ≤ (w j t)λ i + p ij using Claim 10. Further, if
therefore β ij = (w j t)λ i + p jt using Claim 13. Hence the KKT conditions hold and the proof is completed.
Pareto optimality of equilibrium allocation follows from the fact that earliest slots are filled first (Lemma 4) and therefore total cost is always j,t≤r j (A) w j t + j r j (A) (r j (A) − r j (A) ). Thus, we get that the our market model satisfies First Welfare Theorem when G t = G, ∀t.
Algorithm
In this section we will design a polynomial-time algorithm to find λ and p that satisfy all the conditions of Theorem 12, and thereby get a market equilibrium. In this theorem we are partitioning agents by equality in λ i s and assigning agents of a partition to a contiguous set of slots where prices form an arithmetic progression with difference being λ i . Overall prices form a non-increasing piecewise-linear convex curve.
Our algorithm will construct each (segment) linear-piece of the price-curve and corresponding assignment of agents inductively starting from the last linear piece. In other words we will compute the set S of agents with least λ i , and their corresponding λ value. This will give us prices of last r j (S) slots, as they form AP with w j λ i as difference and last price being zero. Then we will remove agents in S and the last r j (S) slots allocated to them, and recurs. To avoid using and , and for notational simplicity, for now we assume that each r ij is a non-negative integer. Later we will show that the entire algorithm extends easily for the general case with careful handling at the boundary of each linear-piece.
If S is the set of agents assigned to the last segment, then their λ and prices of corresponding slots can be computed as follows. We will denote this value by λ S .
• Let T j = r j (A)+1. Set p jT j = 0, and ∀j,
Clearly, the set that forms the last segment has to give the least λ, i.e., arg min S ⊆A λ(S ). Trying out all possible sets will take exponential time. Instead suppose we could guess λ corresponding to the last segment, then the corresponding set should be minimizer of
And the minimum value should be zero.
Lemma 14
For any given λ ≥ 0 and integers T j , ∀j, function f λ,T is sub-modular.
Proof : For simplicity let us denote f λ,T by f . Suppose S ⊂ S and i ∈ S then we have
Inequality (*) holds because the prices are decreasing and r j (S) > r j (S ). 2
Finding a minimizing set of a sub-modular function can be done in polynomial time [38] , and therefore we can find set S * ∈ arg min S⊆A f λ,T (S) in polynomial time. The trick now is to guess right value of λ for which we will apply a careful binary search using the fact that minimum value is zero at right λ. To find λ and corresponding set of agents for the second last segment we need to start the last prices at (T j −r j (S * ))w j λ S * for good j, where S * ∈ arg min S⊆A f λ,T (S). Thus in general, to find next segment all we need to know is the remaining set of agents and price of last allocated slot for each good. To incorporate this, we modify the definition of function f as follows. Let p l = (p l 1 , . . . , p l |G| ) be the prices of last allocated slots in each good.
Based on this intuition we design Algorithm 1. and S * = arg min
Set λ 0 = λ *
8:
else Set λ 1 = λ *
9:
end if 10: end while 11: Return S 0 and λ =
It is easy to see that the next lemma follows using [38] , from the description of the algorithm and the the fact that minimum difference between λ S for any two sets of agents is at most exponentially small.
Lemma 15
Given a set of agents A and a price vector p l , LeastSeg(p l ,A) terminates in time poly(|A|, |G|, L), where L = max i ∈ A, jr ij + bit-length of max i∈A m i . Furthermore, if A is non-empty then it returns a non-empty set.
Next we design an inductive algorithm that computes segments starting from the last, their corresponding λ and the set of agents. 
Set T j = T j − r j (S k ) and p l j = p jT j , ∀j ∈ G.
7:
Set ∀i ∈ S k , λ i = λ k , A = A \ S k , and k = k + 1. 8: end while 9: Output λ and p.
Clearly the above algorithm will terminate in O(|A|) iterations, as each call of LeastSeg will decrease the size of A by at least one. Thus using Lemma 15 we get the following lemma.
Lemma 16 Algorithm 2 terminates in time poly(|A|, |G|, L), where L = ij r ij + bit-length of max i∈A m i .
Next we show that Algorithm 2 computes higher and higher λ in every iteration. Suppose the algorithm goes through n iteration of the while loop. Consider the S k and λ k generated as output of LeastSeg in k th iteration.
Lemma 17 λ k ≤ λ (k+1) , ∀k < n.
Proof :
Suppose not and ∃k < n where λ k > λ (k+1) . Let S = S k ∪ S k+1 . To get a contradiction we show the algorithm should have chosen S instead of S k at step k. Letλ k denote the value of λ k if the algorithm chooses S instead of S k at step k. Letp j = p j(T j −r j (∪ i<k S i )+1) , where T j = r j (A). Note that, reversing calculation of λ in line 8 of LeastSeg for S k , we get:
On the other hand note that
So by combining the above two inequalities we get thatλ k < λ k which is a contradiction because then the algorithm at each step k should have chosen S instead of S k . 2
To show that Algorithm 2 computes equilibrium prices, it is enough to show that the computed p and λ satisfy all the conditions of Theorem 9.
Lemma 18 Let p and λ be output of Algorithm 2, and let
p jt > p j(t+1) and p jr j (A) = 0 ∀j, ∀t ≤ r j (A) :
Proof : We only prove the last condition holds. All the other conditions follow easily with the algorithm description. It is easy to show the last condition is equivalent to
So we'll show this one. Suppose it doesn't hold then ∃S ⊂ A, j,t≤r j (S) p j(r k j −t+1) > i∈S m i . We claim the algorithm should have chose S instead of S k in k th iteration because f p l ,λ k (S) = i∈S m i − j,t≤r j (S) p j(r k j −t+1) < 0. So we get a contradiction. 2
Note that the conditions shown in Lemma 18 are exactly those of Theorem 9, where n = u, and Q d = S n−d+1 . Thus using Lemmas 16 and 18, and Theorem 9 we get the main result.
Theorem 19 Given a market M, Algorithm 2 computes λ and p in polynomial-time in the description of M, and p is an equilibrium price vector of market M.
Algorithm 2 gives equilibrium prices. To find equilibrium allocation we can solve linear feasibility problem by plugging in values of p jt s into feasibility conditions, and then solving for f ijt s.
Remark 20
Even though, for the case when G t = G, ∀t, actual description of the market is O(|G| + |A| + log(r) + log(m) + log(w)), where log(v) for a vector v is k log(v k ), the description of the equilibrium prices and allocations still requires ij r ij space as we need to decide allocation and prices of those many slots. Thus, our algorithm is polynomial-time in this description which is unavoidable.
If we care only about equilibrium prices, then our algorithm can be modified so that it runs in time poly(A, G, log(r) + log(m) + log(w); for each segment instead of storing prices explicitly, it can store corresponding set of agents, λ, and starting and ending slot for each good. Since # iterations is bounded by |A| storing this information takes O(|G| + |A| + log(r)) space. The only difference in the While loop of the algorithm will be to not compute prices explicitly and instead just compute ending slot and its price, i.e., in step 5 compute only p jT j , ∀j. Similarly in LeastSeg, we can compute f p l ,λ,T (S) in time O(|S| + log(r) + log(m)) using the property that prices of good j are arithmetic progression starting at p l j with difference w j λ. Thus, overall running time will be poly(A, G, log(r) + log(m) + log(w).
Arbitrary rational r ij s. For the case when r ij s are fractional it suffices to find λ and p that satisfy conditions of Theorem 12, and we will argue that a careful modification of the above algorithm works. Basically, we need to take care of partially allocated slots at the end of each iteration.
Our algorithm does allocation backwards, starting from the last slot. We need to make sure that when it terminates, the first slot of all goods are fully-allocated. Note that if T j = r j (A) is not integral, then slot T j will be allocated up to a j = T j − T j amount and is priced at zero. We ensure this by modifying LeastSeg to incorporate a fixed subtraction from r j (S) while computing f p l ,λ,T . In particular, in first call to LeastSeg (to compute S 1 ), it will subtract a j from r j (S).
In consecutive iterations we may also need to subtract some money from i∈S m i . This is because, imagine the earliest allocated segment in the first iteration is partially filled for some of the goods. Then agents of S 2 have to buy the rest of these slots. If price of the earliest allocated slot of good j is p l j and is filled up to 1 − a j by agents of S 1 , then agents of S 2 will have to spend total of j a j p l j money to fill these. Thus, while calculating f p l ,λ,T (S) during the second call to LeastSeg, we need to subtract this amount from i∈S m i . To incorporate this redefine function f .
where τ j = T j − (r j (S) − a j ), ∀j, and
We have to do other minor modifications to take care of the fact that r ij s are non-integral. The modified algorithm and subroutine are as follows. Lemmas proving its correctness and run time analysis follow almost as is.
Algorithm 3 Algorithm and its subroutine for fractional r ij s.
and S * = arg min S⊂Â f p l ,λ * ,T ,a (S).
Set λ 0 = λ * 8:
end if 10: end while 11: Calculate λ such that f p l ,λ,T ,a (S 0 ) = 0. 
Set ∀i ∈ S k , λ i = λ k , A = A \ S k , and k = k + 1. 22: end while 23: Output λ and p.
Note that, as per the output of the above Algorithm 3, if slot t is shared by S k and S k+1 , then p jt − p j(t+1) = w j λ k and p j(t−1) − p jt = w j λ k+1 . Furthermore, we can show that Lemma 17 still holds, and hence price function remains piecewise-linear convex. The rest of the conditions needed in Theorem 12 follows similar to the integral case using these two observations. Thus the next result follows:
Theorem 21 Given market M with G t = G, ∀t, Algorithm 3 computes its equilibrium in polynomial time.
Case G t ⊂ G : Characterization and Algorithm
For the case when in slot t only G t ⊂ G of goods are available, we need to modify the equilibrium characterization and algorithm to make sure that if good j / ∈ G t then it is never allocated to any agent in slot t. To obtain a characterization for this case, we will simply omit variables corresponding to missing goods in each slot, i.e., drop p jt and f ijt , for all j ∈ G t . We will again construct a solution such that dual variable γ ijt s are all zero. To account for the absence of some goods in some slot, we define the following set consists of slots that can fulfill a specific requirement for good j starting from the first slot. We abuse the notation and define this function with respect to a set of agents, as well as a number.
Definition 22 Define π j (S) = {t ≤ τ | j ∈ G t }, where τ is an earliest slot such that |π j (S)| = r j (S) . Also define π j (k) = {t ≤ τ | j ∈ G t }, where τ is an earliest slot such that |π j (S)| = k .
Furthermore, for a set of slots T , let max(T ) and min(T ) represent the maximum and minimum numbered slot respectively in T . It is not difficult to show counterparts of Lemmas 1, 2, 4, and 5 similarly, with following appropriate changes. Thumb-rule is to consider good j in slot t only if j ∈ G t .
• In Lemma 1we have f ijt = 1, ∀j, ∀t ∈ π j ( r ij ) and f ij max(π j ({i})) = r ij − r ij , instead.
• In Lemma 4, we have p jt ≥ p jt , ∀t, t ∈ π j (A), t < t ; p jt = 0, ∀t > max(π j (A)) instead.
•
Thus it follows that prices will still form a piecewise-linear convex curve, with some slots and their prices missing for a good. The only ingredient remaining to formalize the sufficiency conditions is the feasibility lemma, which can be restated as follows.
Lemma 23 There exists a feasible allocation f iff for all subsets S ⊆ A we have j ( t∈π j ( r j (S) ) p jt + p j max(π j (S)) (r j (S) − r j (S) )) ≥ i∈S m i , and j,t∈π j (A) p jt = i∈A m i .
Proof of the above lemma follows similar to that of Lemma 23. Finally, the theorem defining sufficient conditions for λ and p to constitute market equilibrium is as follows:
Theorem 24 Given λ and prices p, such that λ 1 ≥ · · · ≥ λ |A| > 0, let agents be grouped in to Q 1 , . . . , Q u sets by equality of
Next we design an algorithm to compute λ and p that satisfy all the conditions of Theorem 24. In the algorithm, again we need to make sure that we talk about only available goods in every slot. Since our algorithm does allocation in backward order, we need to consider set of slots allocated to agents from back. Furthermore, the last slot changes in every iteration of our algorithm. Therefore, w.r.t. last allocated slots T define,
where τ is the latest slot such that |π j (S)| = r j (S) . Also define π T j (k) = {τ ≤ t < T j | j ∈ G t }, where τ is the latest slot such that |π j (S)| = k . Redefine function f to incorporate unavailability of goods in some slots.
where τ j = (r j (S) − a j ), ∀j, and
Modified algorithm and the LeastSeg subroutine, so that good j is considered in slot t only if j ∈ G t , are given in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Algorithm and its subroutine for the case when G t = G.
and S * = arg min
20:
Set ∀i ∈ S k , λ i = λ k , A = A \ S k , and k = k + 1. Running time and correctness analysis for Algorithm 4 follows similar to the case when G t = G, ∀t. And we get the following theorem.
21:
Theorem 26 Given market M, Algorithm 4 computes its equilibrium in polynomial time.
Again, Pareto optimality of equilibrium allocation follows from the fact that earliest slots are filled first (Lemma 4) and therefore total cost is always j,t∈π j ( r j (A) ) w j t + j max(π j (A))(r j (A) − r j (A) ). Thus, we get that our market model satisfies First Welfare Theorem.
Continuous Case
In this section we discuss the continuous case of our model where time is not divided in slots, and changes continuously. Accordingly price and allocation are functions of time. We define function f ij (t) to represent allocation of good j to agent i across time, and function p j (t) represents price of good j. Next we show that this case can be handled with a careful modification to our approach for the discrete case.
Equilibrium Characterization
Since it is no more possible to capture prices and allocation in finitely many variables, the optimal bundle LP (1) does not apply, and we need to re-derive the properties characterizing equilibria. Given price functions p j s, the optimal bundle of agent i can be calculated using the following continuous linear program (CLP) instead, where f ij s are un-known. min :
Using the duality theory for CLP [4] we arrive at the following characterization of optimal solution for the above program which is similar to what we have in the discrete case (see Section 3). Note that since the last constraint hold for every time t, the corresponding dual variable γ ij (t) is a function, while for first and second constraint dual variables are β ij and λ i respectively.
Assuming ∀t, ∀j, γ ij (t) = 0, and λ i > 0. Again we will generate a solution where the agent spends all of its money and thereby we have λ i > 0, and γ ij (t) = 0. As done in Section 3, dividing all the relevant conditions by λ i and renaming give the following.
Note that the assumptions are not necessary but we will see that in the end we will still be able to find a solution satisfying the conditions. Since the KKT conditions (12) are same as (5) of the discrete case, except for continuous variables, using similar reasoning as Lemmas 2 and 4 it follows that for each good j function p j (t) has to be decreasing, piecewise-linear and convex. Furthermore, an agent is allocated to a single segment in each good, and slope of that segment has to be −w j λ i . The next lemma summaries these:
Lemma 27 At equilibrium p j is a decreasing, piecewise-linear convex function for each good j. Furthermore, if the first and last time where agent i is allocated good j are s and s , such that s < s , then ∂p j ∂t (t) = −w j λ i , ∀s < t < s ; ∂p j ∂t (t) ≤ −w j λ i , ∀t < s, and
Computing feasible allocation f ij (t)s in polynomial time, given such a price functions is a bit tricky due to the continuous nature of the allocation. Next we show existence of feasible allocation through a constructive proof, which also gives a polynomial-time procedure to compute one.
Definition 28
Definition 29
We say that an allocation f is feasible if it is weakly-feasible and ∀i :
Following is the modified versions of Lemma 8 for the continuous case, with the difference that the proof here is constructive.
Lemma 30 A feasible allocation f exists iff we have
Proof : Let's start with a weakly-feasible allocation f and modify it to get a feasible allocation. For agent i let
f ij (t)p j (t)dt), and let s ij and e ij denote the earliest and latest points of time that good j is allocated to i, respectively. We say i ≺î if sî j < e ij for some good j. For each agent i 0 such that lm i 0 > 0 we do the following.
• While lm i 0 > 0 do 1. Find shortest sequence of agents i 0 , i 1 , . . . , i k such that i 0 ≺ i 1 ≺ · · · ≺ i k and lm k < 0.
2. Simultaneously swap allocation between agents i r and i r+1 , ∀r ∈ [0, k) such that all lm ir s remain unchanged except lm i 0 and lm i k . Note that for agents i r and i r+1 we have s i r+1ĵ < e irĵ for some goodĵ. By swapping allocation of between i r and i r+1 we mean swapping the earliest allocation of i r+1 with latest allocation of i r for goodĵ.
(Note that swapping allocation between i r and i r+1 would increase lm r because the prices are decreasing. On the other hand swapping allocation between i r−1 and i r would decrease lm r . Therefore it is possible to do the swapping simultaneously with certain rations such that lm ir s remain unchanged ∀r ∈ [1, k − 1].)
3. The swapping must be done until we have i 0 ≺ i 1 ≺ · · · ≺ i k , lm i k < 0 and lm i 0 > 0.
The following claim proves that we never get stuck during the procedure.
Claim 31 Suppose lm i 0 > 0, then there exists a sequence of agents such that i 0 ≺ i 1 ≺ · · · ≺ i k and lm i k < 0.
Proof : Let S denote set of all agents like i where there is a sequence of agents such that i 0 ≺ i 1 ≺ · · · ≺ i.
If ∃i ∈ S such that lm i < 0 then we are done. Suppose not then we have i∈S lm i > 0. Note that the interval [0, r j (S)] of each good j has been allocated to S. Therefore, we have
which is a contradiction. 2
Let E denote the set of all pairs (i,î) such that i ≺î,î = i 0 and lm i ≥ 0. Let S 0 denote the set of all agents i with lm i = 0. The following claim shows the procedure finishes in polynomial time.
Claim 32 After each round of the loop |E| − |S 0 | decreases by at least one.
Proof : Note that by swapping the allocation at each round we only decrease lm i 0 and increase lm i k while other lm i s remain unchanged so |S 0 | would not decreases during the swapping. Also note that since we choose the shortest sequence at each round, it is easy to show that for all i r , where r ∈ [1, k − 1], we only might increase s irj and decrease e irj . So |E| would not increase during the swapping.
On the other hand, if after the swapping we have lm i 0 = 0 or lm i k = 0 then we increase |S 0 | by at least one. Else ∃r such that i r ≺ i r+1 before swapping and i r ≺ i r+1 after the swapping. Therefore, we decrease |E| by at least one. So in total we decrease |E| − |S 0 | by at least one.
So the procedure finishes in polynomial times. Note that at the end we have ∀i, lm i ≤ 0. Also using the second assumption of lemma we get i lm i = 0. Therefore, ∀i, lm i = 0. So we find a feasible allocation and the proof is completed.
Now we have all ingredients to derive sufficiency conditions characterizing equilibria. The following theorem is analogous of Theorem 9, and proof too follows similarly using Lemmas 27 and 30.
Theorem 33 Given λ and prices p, such that λ 1 ≥ · · · ≥ λ |A| > 0, let agents be grouped in to Q 1 , . . . , Q u sets by equality of
Algorithm
The algorithm for continuous case is almost identical to the discrete case. There are only some slight modifications needed in defining function f λ and its variants to take into consideration continuously changing prices.
Note that Theorem 33 shows that the prices will be piecewise linear convex functions where each linear piece corresponds to one of the Q i 's. So the output of the algorithm can just be the start and end point of linear pieces; recall Remark 20.
Algorithm 5 Algorithm and its subroutine for the continuous case
end if 10: end while 
19:
Set ∀i ∈ S k , λ i = λ k , A = A \ S k , and k = k + 1. 21: end while 22: Output λ and p.
For the time complexity of Algorithm 5, if we keep track of only starting and ending price of a segment in step 18, then it computes price functions of all the goods in polynomial time. Furthermore, we also know the set of agents assigned to each segment. Then the exact allocation f ij (t)s can be computed in polynomialtime using the procedure described in the proof of Lemma 30. Algorithm 5 being analogous to Algorithm 4 for the discrete case, the correctness follows similarly. In other words, we get allocation and prices that satisfy all the conditions of Theorem 33, implying that these form an equilibrium.
Generalization to Concave Rate Functions and Existence
We present here a general model of a scheduling market, for which we will show existence of equilibria. There are many interesting special cases of this very general model, and we expect that this model will provide a rich set of questions regarding computability of equilibria, and otherwise, in the future.
A buyer in the market has a set of jobs, say J i for buyer i. Each job k is defined by a continuous, nondecreasing, and concave, rate function , U k i . When given a bundle of goods x k it ∈ R G + in slot t, a U k i (x k it ) fraction of job k can be completed in that slot. Therefore the requirement for this job is t U k i (x k it ) ≥ 1. The buyer wants to complete all his jobs at a cost no larger than his budget m i , i.e., k t x k it · p t ≤ m i , and minimize the weighted flow time, k w k i t tU k i (x k it ). The amount of good j available in slot t is c jt . Market clears when there is no over demand of any good, and demand < supply implies the price is 0. The market we consider in this paper is a special case where there is a job for every good with r ij > 0, and the rate function of the job corresponding to good j is simply x j /r ij . Further, the weights in the flow-time are universal, and don't depend on the buyer.
In the generalized market, at given prices p jt for a unit of good j in slot t, agent i's optimization problem is as follows, where x k itj is the amount of good j allocated to job k in slot t:
Prices are said to be at equilibrium, if when every agent is given its optimal bundle, market clears. Formally, ∀j, ∀t,
Equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist even in standard Fisher and Arrow-Debreu market models [2] , and checking existence can become hard [9, 40, 21] . For these models, the standard practice is to assume some mild sufficiency conditions that ensures existence [2, 32] . One of these conditions is non-satiation, i.e., agent can get more and more utility by consuming more. In our market too we need to assume the following non-satiation like condition to show existence of equilibrium. We also assume that U k i s are well-behaved in a standard sense.
Cond-NS:
Every agent i has to consume some good j in at least c j1 amount to fulfill all its job requirements.
Cond-LC
We will show existence by defining a correspondence whose fixed-points give market equilibria. The correspondence is motivated by the construction of Vazirani and Yannakakis [40] . Given a market let T be the maximum slot requirement for any good; this can be calculated easily from U k i s. Let D be the set of all (p, x) such that ∀(i, j, k, t), 0 ≤ x k ijt ≤ c jt + and p ≥ 0, jt c jt p jt ≤ i m i . Consider correspondence F : D D, if (p , x ) ∈ F (p,x), then
jt c jt p jt ≤ i m i i,j,k,t p jtx k itj (16) We consider prices of all the goods in slots beyond T to be zero. Vector (x * , p * ) is said to be a fixed point of F if (x * , p * ) ∈ F (x * , p * ).
Lemma 35
If (x * , p * ) is a fixed-point of F , then p * is at equilibrium in market M. Furthermore, at this equilibrium all agents spend all their money.
Proof : Market equilibrium requires two conditions to be satisfied: (i) every agent gets optimal bundle, i.e., x i is solution of OP T i . (ii) market clears, i.e., (15) . First is satisfied by definition of F given in (16) , since x * ∈ OP T i (p * ). For the second, we need to prove two conditions of (15) . Since x * i ∈ OP T i (p * ), we have jt p * jt ( x * k itj )) ≤ m i , ∀i, a contradiction. 2
Claim 37 ∀(j, t), ik x * k itj < c jt ⇒ p * jt = 0.
Proof : To the contrary suppose ∃(j , t ) s.t., p * j t > 0 and ik x * k it j < c j t . Then, using similar analysis as of Claim 36 shows that ∀(j, t), ik x * k itj < c jt and in turn i ( jt p * jt ( x * k itj )) < i m i . Thus some agent is not spending all its money to buy an optimal bundle. Let this agent be i . Now by the Cond-NS defined above there exists a good j which she can consume fully in first slot to fulfill her job requirements. However, for this good too is under sold in its first slot, ik x * k i1j < c j1 . So she must be given higher slot instead in x * i . But then she can reduce her total flow time by buying good j in first slot, contradicting optimality of x * i for OP T i (p * ). 2
Thus it follows that (p * , x * ) constitute an equilibrium. 2
A correspondence from a closed convex set to itself has a fixed-point if every point evaluates to a closed convex set and its graph is closed [30] . Next we show the same for F .
Lemma 38 ∀(p,x) ∈ D, F (p,x) is convex and closed.
Proof : The result follows using the fact that in (16) Proof : Let us divide F into F 1 and F 2 , where if (p , x ) = F (p, x), then p = F 1 (x) and x = F 2 (p).
By continuity of addition and max functions it follows that F 1 has a closed graph and therefore p * ∈ F 1 (x * ).
For F 2 we need to understand how the solution of OP T i changes with prices. We will show that it changes continuously using the fact that prices of goods in slots beyond T th slot is zero. To the contrary suppose x * / ∈ F 2 (p * ). Instead letx ∈ F 2 (p * ). Let cost i (x i ) denote the flow-time cost (objective function of OP T i ) of agent i at bundle x i . Then, ∃i, δ = cost i (x * i ) − cost i (x i ) > 0. Using this we will show a contradiction to x d ∈ F 2 (p d ), ∀d. Since cost i is a continuous function, and since x d → x * , ∃d s.t. The next theorem follows using Lemmas 35, 38, and 39, and the fact that a correspondence from closed convex set to itself with closed graph has a fixed-point [30] .
Theorem 40
If market M satisfies Cond-NS and Cond-LC then it has an equilibrium. Furthermore, all the agents spend all their money at this equilibrium.
Remark 41
It is easy to construct examples where not every one spends all their money at all equilibria. Consider a market with single good available in unit amount in all the slots, and two agents, with 10 and 1 dollars respectively. Both wants to finish one job each with U i = x 1 and r i = 1. Then, p 11 = 2 + δ, p 12 = 1, ∀δ ≤ 8 are equilibria, where first agent gets the first slot and second gets the second slot. Note that, except for δ = 8, everywhere else agent 1 under spends.
